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Abstract 
Risk analysis is a collection of methods widely used in many industrial sectors. 
In the transport sector it has been particularly used for air transport applications. 
The reasons for this wide use are well-known; risk analysis allows us to 
approach the safety theme in a stochastic – rather than deterministic – way, it 
forces us to break down the system in sub-components. Last, but not least, 
it allows a comparison between solutions with different costs, introducing de 
facto an element of economic feasibility of the project alternatives in the safety 
field. Apart from the United Kingdom, in Europe, the application of this tool in 
the railway sector is relatively recent. In particular, Directive 2004/49/EC (the 
“railway safety directive”) provides for compulsory risk assessment in relation to 
the activities of railway Infrastructure Managers (IMs) and of Railway 
Undertakings (RUs). Nevertheless, the peculiarity of the railway system – in 
which human, procedural, environmental and technological components have a 
continuous interchange and in which human responsibilities and technological 
functions often overlap – induced the EC to allow wide margins of subjectivity 
in the interpretation of risk assessment. When enacting Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 352/2009 which further regulates this subject, a risk assessment is 
considered positive also if the IM or RU declare to take safety measures widely 
used in normal practice. The paper shows the results of a structured comparative 
analysis of the rail sector and other industrial sectors, which illustrate the 
difficulties but also the opportunities of a transfer towards the railway system of 
the risk analysis methods currently in use for the other systems. 
Keywords:  railway risk assessment, comparison with road and industry. 
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1 Introduction: recent developments in the European railway 
system organization 
The studies in the field of the railway operations move along an ideal hyperbole 
describing the inverse relationship that exists between safety and supply capacity 
in the railway systems [1–3]. During railway system’s development, the 
necessity of maximum safety often prevailed against the target of maximum 
capacity, both for cultural approach and for the fact that every European rail 
company, apart from enjoying a monopoly on the entire national system, had in 
itself the whole chain of industrial and commercial process, from the line 
construction and management to the traffic organization, even the commercial 
services. 
     In recent years, social events and technological developments changed this 
setting. For example, focusing on the Italian situation, first the privatization of 
the “Ferrovie dello Stato” group and then the corporate unbundling, that did the 
group splitting between engineering services (Italferr), infrastructure manager 
(RFI) and railway undertaking (Trenitalia), entailed an increasing attention to 
economic processes’ efficiency. Moreover, the market liberalization for railway 
undertakings caused the births and, in a few years, the multiplication of 
companies operating in goods transport, while in passenger transport a real 
competition with Trenitalia comes true only now, after many years of a de facto 
monopoly. 
     Also the construction of lines and trains that can reach speeds of about 
200 km/h changed in some important cases, as Rome – Milan, the service of rail 
transport in substitution of the plane, forcing an increase of traffic frequency on 
some routes. 
     Over the years the concept of safety changed too. It’s increasingly closer to 
become in acceptance of risk, but not yet in the current Italian legislation. This 
does not mean that there is less focus on the central theme of transport safety, but 
rather the attempt to insert a standard of feasibility in the railway system. 
2 Railway liberalization and safety in Europe 
Railway liberalization in the European Union is still growing after two decades. 
The adoption of technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs), designed to 
make interoperable the various national systems and to uniform level of safety 
EU Member States, helped the European Commission to open to free 
competition between companies that manage the transportation service. 
The first point to highlight is the system of authorisation and certification of 
railway safety, because the coming of the independence of RUs from State 
control (privatization process) and a first separation between RUs and IMs 
(process of industrial chains unbundling) indirectly delegated procedure 
implementation of system safety to the same RUs and IMs, so no more to the 
States, guarantor “super partes” of the population safety. 
     This package also contains the Directive 2004/49/EC, called “Railway Safety 
Directive”. This Directive lays down general guidelines for the definition of 
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common European policies relating to railway safety, presenting the fundamental 
“purpose” (art.1) of harmonising the regulatory structure in the Member States. 
This legislation represents a significant turning point in the field of railway 
safety: on the one hand (art.4, par.1) “Member States shall ensure that railway 
safety is generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously 
improved”, on the other the same (art.4, par.3) “Member States shall ensure that 
the responsibility for the safe operation of the railway system and the control of 
risks associated with it is laid upon the IMs and RUs, obliging them to 
implement necessary risk control measures, where appropriate in cooperation 
with each other, to apply national safety rules and standards, and to establish 
safety management systems (SMSs)”. 
     This must be based on Common Safety Methods (CSMs), that (art.2, par.2-f) 
“means the methods to be developed to describe how safety levels and 
achievement of safety targets and compliance with other safety requirements are 
assessed”, to reach the Common Safety Targets (CSTs), that (art.2, par.2-e) 
“means the safety levels that must at least be reached by different parts of the rail 
system and by the system as a whole, expressed in risk acceptance criteria”, that 
is expressed through the Common safety indicators (CSIs), introduced by the 
same Directive, that means indicators of occurrence that can standardize the 
assessment of the system safety and give an indication on the achievement of 
CSTs, in order to facilitate monitoring. 
     It is important to highlight the issue of Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 352/2009 on the adoption of a CSM on risk evaluation and assessment. By 
now, even the culture of the railway world must address the risk analysis, after 
decades that the approach to accident prevention was always deterministic. The 
Regulation, conforming to Directive 2004/49/EC, requires RUs and IMs to 
apply, in case of new systems introduction or in case of “significant change” of a 
system, a CSM to effectuate a risk management process and independent 
assessment about system safety, based on risk assessment and analysis. In 
Regulation annex I “the risk assessment process is the overall iterative process 
that comprises: a) the system definition; b) the risk analysis including the hazard 
identification; c) the risk evaluation.” 
     Regarding point b), regulation requires three possible criteria to apply for 
evaluating the acceptability of risk that are: use of codes of practice, use of 
reference system and explicit risk estimation both qualitative or quantitative. 
From this it follows that if you want to implement a new technology or a new 
system, the only way forward is the application of an extended risk analysis. 
3 Application of risk analysis in the railway sector 
3.1 Common safety method for the rail risk assessment 
As mentioned above, the Commission Regulation (EC) N. 352/09 has the aim of 
introducing a Common Safety Method (CSM) for risk evaluation and assessment 
methods in railway sector mentioned in Article 6(3)(a) of Directive 2004/49/EC. 
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     The CSM, favouring the access to the rail transport service market, promotes 
(Article 1(2)) “the harmonisation of:  
a) the risk management processes used to assess the safety levels and the 
compliance with safety requirements; 
b) the exchange of safety-relevant information between different actors 
within the rail sector in order to manage safety across the different 
interfaces which may exist within this sector; 
c) the evidence resulting from the application of a risk management 
process.” 
     The iterative process of risk management is framed in three main phases: 
1. systematic identification of hazards, on basis of system definition and 
corresponding safety measures and requirements. 
2. analysis and evaluation of risks; 
3. demonstration of the compliance of the system with identified safety 
requirements. 
     The hazards are identified by wide-ranging expertise from a competent team 
and they are registered in the “hazard record”. 
     The classification of the hazard is carried out according to their evaluated 
risks, to focus the assessment on the main risks. 
     For this assessment the CSM identifies the following three criteria of risk 
acceptance, to be applied during the phases of risk evaluation and analysis: 
1. Use of codes of practice and risk evaluation (compliance to TSI, 
national and European); 
2. Use of reference system and risk evaluation (uniformity between safety 
level of reference system and the system to be evaluated) 
3. Explicit risk estimation and evaluation (risk estimation deriving from 
hazard, in qualitative and/or quantitative manner). 
     The codes of practice shall at least: a) have a wide recognition in the rail 
sector, otherwise, these codes must be accompanied by any necessary 
explanations and must be deemed acceptable to the assessment, b) be relevant to 
the containment of the considered hazards in the system under assessment; c) be 
available for all those who want to use them. 
     A reference system shall at least: a) has already been proven in practice, to 
ensure an acceptable level of safety and to be approved in the Member State in 
which the change is to be introduced, b) has similar functions and interaction 
similar to those the system under assessment, c) it is used under similar 
operational conditions as the system under assessment, d) be used under similar 
environmental conditions as the system to be evaluated. 
     The explicit and accurate determination of risk must meet at least the 
following requirements: a) the methods used must faithfully represent the system 
under assessment and its parameters (including all operational modes), b) the 
results should be sufficiently accurate to serve as a solid basis for decision 
making. 
     The guidelines [4] show different examples of the application of the previous 
criteria; in the next section we report one in which all three criteria are used, 
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while in the next there is the suggested methodology for risk analysis in extended 
tunnel, the only legislated example in Italy. 
3.2 An example of use of all criteria 
The example concerns a technical change to the control-command system: the 
substitution of a loop located on the ground before a signal with a subsystem 
“radio infill + GSM.” The function of the “loop + encoder” in the existing 
system is to output the signal at the approach of a train when the stretch behind 
the signal (i.e. in front of the approaching train) is free. The evaluation of the risk 
has to demonstrate that the system maintains the same level of safety pre-
modification. In the following paragraphs are presented the logical scheme of the 
risk assessment. 
     The change is considered significant due to two criteria: complexity and 
novelty. For the identification of hazards, applying the iterative process of risk 
assessment and the identification of hazards on the basis of a brainstorming 
carried out by a group of experts in order to: (1) identify hazardous events with 
substantial influence on the risk determined by the desired change, (2) identify 
possible actions to control the risk. Since the loop, and then the radio infill, emits 
the signal, there is the risk of giving an unsafe movement authority to the 
approaching train, when the previous train still occupies the block section in 
front of the signal. The risk must be controlled to an acceptable level. To do this, 
we use the following criteria: 
a) Use of a reference system: the level of safety of the system before the 
change (loop) is considered acceptable. It is then used as a “reference 
system” to derive the safety requirements for the subsystem radio infill. 
b) Explicit risk assessment: the explicit risk assessment analyzes the 
differences between the subsystems “loop” and “radio infill + GSM”. 
For the subsystem “radio infill + GSM” are identified the following new 
hazards: (i) transmission by hackers of information since the “radio 
infill + GSM” is a subsystem of open transmission; (ii) delay in 
transmission or transmission of data packets stored in the air gap; 
c) Use of codes of practice: the standard EN 50159-2 provides the security 
requirements to control new hazards to an acceptable level, while EN 
50128 provides guidelines for the development of the software of the 
control device of the radio infill. 
     At this point the person in charge of the change can demonstrate the 
conformity of the system (in the design and installation) safety requirements and 
manage the hazards that are identified, noting the latter, the security measures 
and the resulting safety requirements resulted from the evaluation of the risk and 
the application of the three principles of risk acceptance in a hazard record. 
Finally is also carried out an independent assessment by a third party in order to 
verify that the management and risk assessment are carried out correctly and that 
the technical change is appropriate and maintains the same level of security 
/safety before the change itself. 
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     In this way the risk assessment in the example fulfills all the requirements of 
the CSM, including the management of the hazard record and the independent 
safety assessment performed by a third party. 
3.3 An example of extended risk analysis methodology for the safety of 
railway tunnel 
The Ministerial Decree of 28 October 2005 on Safety in Railway Tunnels 
defines that the risk analysis for railway tunnels should be conducted identifying 
the train-tunnel system as set of three main components: Infrastructure, Rolling 
Stock, Operating procedures; and also considering traffic features (operational 
model and frequency) and traffic typology (passenger or freight). 
     The tunnel system may describe two typologies of path: 
• successful path, in operational condition; 
• accident path, in emergency condition. 
     The typical structure of risk analysis used is a classical bow tie diagram, 
composed of two “wings” linked to a central body that represents the hazard 
from which starts the accident path. The hazard is characterised in terms of 
occurrence probability and potential danger on the basis of statistical data of 
tunnel systems, integrated by available data of the gallery analysed. 
     The left wing identifies the successful path of the gallery where the 
application of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) permits to recognize the causes of 
abnormal event sequences that can lead the occurrence of hazard. This hazard is 
conditioned by the preventive measures adopted. 
     In the right wing the application of Event Tree Analysis (ETA) allows to 
identify the events that may cause the tunnel system development towards 
different accident paths, considering the influence of protection and mitigation 
measures on achievement of the state of “emergency-end”. 
     The Decree identifies reference accident scenarios mainly related to the 
occurrence of 3 hazards: Fire (S1), Derailment (S2), Collision (S3). 
     The possible developments of the scenarios identified are related to the 
performance (effectiveness and efficiency) of preventive, protective or mitigative 
safety measures and devices carried out for the infrastructure, rolling stock and 
operational procedures. 
     The schematisation of an extended risk analysis procedure provided by the 
same Decree reflects the structure is shown in Figure 1. 
     The extended procedure of Figure 1 allows us to analyze the different causes 
that can trigger the reference accident scenarios (fire, derailment and collision) 
through the application of usual techniques of Fault Tree. Similarly the 
application of Event Tree techniques allows us to study the different system 
development paths that can be generated by the reference accident scenarios. 
     The risk analysis is therefore based on the application of probabilistic 
methods for assessing the risk level linked to the occurrence of complex events 
using Fault and Event Tree Analysis techniques, integrated with the study of 
accident scenarios for the assessment of consequences related with each possible 
state-of-emergency end. 
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 Figure 1: Schematisation of extended risk analysis. 
     Considering the probabilistic approach, the reference accident scenarios, 
identified by Ministerial Decree of 28 October 2005, must be a complete group 
of incompatible events so as to involve an overall risk for the emergency in 
tunnel equal to the sum of the risks related to each scenario. 
     The reference source of the input data of procedure is the Report on Safety 
State of Railway Tunnels, integrated by information on accident indices and 
failures or malfunction rates of system components collected in an officially 
accredited database. 
     The applicability of this risk analysis procedure to railway tunnel system is 
mainly linked to two factors: 
1. The railway tunnel system can be considered closed and well defined; 
2. The Ministerial Decree of 28 October 2005 has codified a reference 
accident scenarios and it has defined the risk parameters that mainly 
depend on the geometrical configuration of the tunnel (length, cross 
section, spacing between the pedestrian exits, width of the escape 
routes, etc.). 
     Risk analysis is therefore hard to generalize and to apply for open systems 
and however in case it has not been properly codified the accident scenarios. 
     An open system creates difficulties mainly related to the development of fault 
and event trees, which may have a higher or lower detail level depending on the 
expert carrying out the analysis, entailing a higher subjectivity and a different 
end result. 
     In the absence of a general regulation of risk analysis, such subjectivity also 
has consequences on the verification process by a third party, that could be 
considered significant, and as reference, fault and event trees different from 
those developed by the audited entity, could not obtain the approval of the 
applied procedure. 
     For example analysing the event “lifting stones” from the ballast caused by 
the speed and aerodynamics of the train it may have a different development of 
the Event Tree Analysis by two experts. In fact an expert might consider that a 
consequence of stone lifted could be only the damage of floor or bogies of the 
train, while another expert could consider as a consequence also the throwing out 
of the stone to the railway bordering areas with potential injury of a person. 
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     The detail level achieved in the development of the fault and event tree can 
also cause a problem in case of identification of the responsibilities following the 
occurrence of an accident scenario. 
     For instance, the Decree identifies 8 main causes of trigger for accident 
scenario “collision”. If the procedure of risk analysis carried out by the expert 
has properly taken into account of these 8 causes, but the occurrence of collision 
is due to another cause not provided by Ministerial Decree, a possible question is 
what should be the decision of the judge on the assignment of responsibilities.  
     The lack of identification of reference accident scenarios and their 
codification makes difficult the finding of input data of the procedure and of all 
data that, given the probabilistic approach of the process, are significant to 
evaluation of consequences related to each development path of accident 
scenarios analyzed. 
     In addition the identification and codification of accident scenarios could lead 
to the creation of a database that could allow: 
1. the standardization of the information collection on accidental events; 
2. the proper filing of data relating to accident events; 
3. to collect information on events which to date do not have historical 
data, cause of an incorrect filing of accidental information, but may 
have significant data in the future. 
4 Comparison with other sector in terms of risk analysis 
responsibility 
Critical safety aspects were analysed in comparison with road transport and 
industrial plants. This analysis was performed by classifying causes according to 
an extended SHEL model [5]. The extension regards Trespasser. The definitions 
used for the purpose of this article are the following. 
     Software refers to the set of rules, procedures, symbol, and tasks. It represents 
all the laws and regulatory support of the individual workers or team. 
     Hardware means machines, tools, equipment and materials, so the “physical” 
components of the system. Each of us who have a computer at home, know what 
is hardware: the keyboard, screen, main memory.  
     Environment includes all external influences and factors such as policies, 
cultural restrictions, etc. So, the environmental in the broadest sense refers to the 
climate, meteorology, topography, stricto sensu in the social environment of 
work and physical place of work, with their limitations and social and 
economical aspects. 
     Liveware are the operators, defined as the human component of the system 
[6], having a personal relational style.  
Trespasser is people who do not take part in the functioning of the system, but 
that may interact with this voluntary or involuntary. 
     The following table, according to SHELT scheme resumes responsibilities 
and competences in risk assessment in the different sectors. 
     The comparison shows as in the industrial plants, once technological products 
are homologated (H), there is a single subject (IM) which must assess the 
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operation risk in a closed system. Also in road sector, once technological 
products are homologated (H) and obliged transport companies and private users 
to respect road rules, there is an only subject (IM) for risk assessment but the 
system is totally open. 
 
 
Table 1:  Who does risk analysis in different sectors. 
 Railway Road Industrial Plants 
S 
To assess risk, it is 
necessary information 
exchange between IM 
and RU because safety 
procedures have cross-
party responsibilities 
Really only IM assesses 
risk for their 
responsibilities, other 
stakeholders are free 
from mandatory risk 
assessment 
IM assesses risk for their 
responsibilities 
H Risk assessment is scope of RIs 
Risk assessment is scope 
of the industries 
Risk assessment is scope 
of the industries 
E 
IM assesses risk but the 
system is half-open, it 
must choose where 
(network critical point) 
The system is totally 
open and IM is not 
obliged to risk 
assessment (it cannot?) 
IM assesses risk for their 
responsibilities in closed 
system 
L 
To assess risk, it is 
necessary information 
exchange between IM 
and RU because safety 
procedures have cross-
party responsibilities 
IM assesses risk for their 
responsibilities, 
transport companies 
assess their own (w/o 
interaction with IM), 
private users are free 
from assessment 
IM assesses risk for their 
responsibilities 
T 
IM assesses risk but the 
system is half-open, it 
must choose where 
(network critical point) 
The system is totally 
open and IM is not 
obliged to risk 
assessment (it cannot?) 
IM assesses risk for their 
responsibilities in closed 
system 
 
     Railway is the only sector where, once technological products are 
homologated (H), two subjects interact in half-open system and so a single 
subject is not sufficient to carry out a whole risk analysis on rail operation. 
5 Conclusion 
Some peculiarities of railway systems respect to other sectors emerge clearly 
from the previous chapter. In particular two aspects are crucial: the system is 
open, i.e. railway is vulnerable most of all for the Trespasser component, and 
different subjects have roles and functions regarding safety and risk analysis 
application. 
     The following considerations identify critical aspects and responsible bodies 
which risk assessment related to rail operations is filled. 
     I) There are different subjects related to rail operations and nobody covers the 
whole system. In Europe these subjects are railway industries (RIs), 
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infrastructure managers (IMs), railway undertakings which manage transport 
services (RUs) and the national safety authorities (NSAs). 
     II) A specific role (and only this) of safety responsible is assigned to each of 
these subjects, but many relationships between them exist. So, from one hand is 
impossible to identify an unique subject capable to develop an all-embracing risk 
analysis of rail operations, from the other hand the rail actors cannot ignore the 
relationships with other actors in safety procedures. This fact is true in particular 
for the continuous links between an IM and the different RUs that have trains on 
a same infrastructure. 
     III) Considering the SHELT scheme, risk analysis of hardware components 
do not have big difficulties; in fact the problem is reduced in a reliability analysis 
of technological components by RUs; they must respect homologation rules or 
technical standards enacted by NSAs. 
     IV) After technological aspects, the first responsibility of risk assessment of 
rail operations falls on IMs; since system is open and Trespassers are the main 
safety problem as shown in previous chapter, IMs have the necessity of 
circumscribing their analyses; one possible method, perhaps the more simple, is 
to identify critical nodes in their infrastructures. In this sense, for example in 
Italy, there exists a specific law regarding railway tunnel risk analysis, a very 
vulnerable node of rail network. Other possible nodes, where a specific law 
could be desirable, are level crossing, stations, crossing points and however 
where an high traffic level and a big social and environmental impact 
surrounding the rail infrastructure (for example where houses are near the line). 
     V) Knowing infrastructure characteristics, with its risks, to obtain a Safety 
Certificate, which allows train circulation, RUs must do their risk analysis and 
this must be applied exclusively internal procedures (component S) and staff 
training (L), with the only exception of a Rolling Stock Dossier that really is just 
validated by RIs and accepted by IMs. Although the Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 352/2009 concerns railway risk analysis and in Italy there are 
guidelines for risk analysis application enacted from Italian NSA (ANSF), RUs 
have big difficulties in this activity because on one hand the Regulation does not 
include specific methodologies for an extended risk analysis and in general it has 
an high level approach, on the other hand the guidelines, underlining the 
importance of interactions between RUs and IM, avoid a clear demarcation of 
the area of interest to be analysed. The result is RUs are not stimulated to modify 
the status quo (which is intrinsically safe for Commission Regulation (EC) No 
352/2009) because each innovation should be checked through a risk analysis 
and its assessment seems uncertain and, most of all, it has a methodology not 
consolidated in rail scientific literature. This is a problem also for IMs, at least in 
Italy where the NSA does not reach the workforce imposed from Directive 
2004/49/EC and so it is very difficult to assess new risk analysis. 
     VI) To guarantee the good quality of risk analyses of RIs, IMs and RUs, 
NSAs must assess them, checking the compliance with the laws and standards of 
the technological components of the RIs, giving the Safety Authorisation to the 
IMs and the Safety Certificates to the RUs. Beyond this general check on risk 
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assessments of RUs, NSAs must guarantee that these assessments are suitable for 
the portion of infrastructure of the IM requested from RU. 
     The following figure shows the area of interest, according to the SHELT 
schematisation, of the different subjects in charge of carrying out, assessing and 
checking railway risk analyses. 
 
 
Figure 2: Safety responsibilities for different operators. 
 
     Nevertheless, risk analysis represents an opportunity for rail world. In fact: 
a) IM can better assess the critical points of their network, in particular 
where different stakeholders interact (level crossing, station, etc); 
b) RUs can have a greater awareness of their safety procedures, both 
internal and interface with IM and other stakeholders; 
c) Risk analysis allows an univocal identification of responsibility of RIs, 
RUs and IMs. 
     But the possibility of carrying out quantitative railway risk analysis has the 
following main limits: 
a) In railway sector there are very little frequency of hazards and very big 
damage, in economic and social terms, when hazards become accidents; 
b) In the railway accidents the human factor is predominant, both 
Liveware and Trespasser; 
c) Imposing to RUs and IMs a risk assessment on each new component of 
their systems which potentially influence safety, woolly definition but 
inserted in the European laws, stops the technological innovations 
because RUs and IMs incline to ensconce their self in status quo.  
     In order to avoid this potential limitation to technological innovations, it is 
important that the railway researchers work in the future on operational methods 
for performing risk analysis and assessment criteria that are widely shared and 
specifically legislated and which relate to concrete cases, in analogy with what 
has been done in Italy for risk analysis and assessment in the railway tunnels. 
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